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  This paper formally describes the Human Capital Theory as a 
Research Programme that fits into the classical economic Research 
Programmes. The fundamental “hard core” assumption which converts the 
Human Capital Theory into a Research Programme itself in Lakatosian 
terms is based upon the embodiment of the human capital in the person 
investing in it. The paper shows how the auxiliary “protective belt” 
assumptions and the empirical content of the theory are linked to and 
derived from the “hard core” assumptions in such a way that the Human 
Capital Theory satisfies the conditions to be considered a Scientific 
Research Programme.  
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 1. Introduction
In this paper, I attempt to provide arguments to explain why, in recent decades, we have
not observed what Blaug's concluded in 1976 about the gradual replacement of the Human
Capital Theory by the Signalling or Credentialism Theory. To do this, I rstly describe
the Human Capital Theory as a research programme that ts into the Neo-Walrasian
Research Programme. This idea has been informally presented by both Weintraub (1985)
and Backhouse (1991).
In this paper, I describe which parts of the Human Capital Theory can be considered
its `hard core' and which parts determine its `protective belt' to justify the inclusion of the
Human Capital Theory as a sub-programme of the Neo-Walrasian programme in the sense
of Weintraub's and Backhouse's considerations. Furthermore, I do not merely pursue a
descriptive purpose. The main purpose of this paper is the appraisal of the Human Capital
Theory in Lakatosian terms. That is, I wish to ascertain whether the Human Capital
Theory can be considered progressive. Following Backhouse's method, three things must
be done to accomplish this. (1) Find examples of novel facts, which can be (a) predictions
before the event, (b) facts that were not previously explained, (c) new interpretations of
old facts or (d) facts which payed no role in competing research programmes. (2) Show
that these novel facts follow from the hard core and heuristics of the programme. (3) Show
that these were corroborated (Backhouse 1991).
The appraisal criterion followed through Section 4 nds examples of novel facts and
discusses the relationship of these novel facts to both the hard core and protective belt
of the program. An empirical review of the corroborated excess content of the Human
Capital Theory goes beyond the objective of this paper given the huge amount of empirical
literature that the theory has generated.
2. The Initial Problem
In order to appraise the Human Capital Theory as a scientic research programme in
2Lakatosian terms, the starting point is to place the Human Capital Theory in its historical
context and into the bigger research programme of orthodox or neoclassic economics to
which the Human Capital Theory belongs.
The rst question to answer refers to the development dates of the Human Capital
Theory. That is, we should ask why Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer
among others 1 pioneered the body of the Human Capital Theory in the sixties. Why was
no formal theory of Human Capital developed before?. We should consider that the notion
of the importance of education on labor productivity already appears in 1776 with Adam
Smith's \An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations"?.
The main formal body of the Human Capital Theory can be followed through Gary
Becker's work \Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Refer-
ence to Education" whose third edition was published in 1993. As the author acknowledged
in the rst edition in 1964, \The main motivation factor has probably been a realization
that the growth of physical capital, at least at conventionally measured, explains a rel-
atively small part of the growth of income in most countries. The research for better
explanations has led to improved measures of physical capital and to an interest in less
tangible entities, such as technological change and human capital. Also behind this con-
cern is the strong dependence of military technology on education and skills, the rapid
growth in expenditures on education and health, the age-old quest for an understanding
of the personal distribution of income, the recent growth in unemployment in the United
States, the Leontief scarce-factor paradox, and several other important economic prob-
lems". Later, in the Ryserson Lecture given by Becker at the University of Chicago in
1989, he indicated `[...] that human capital analysis has been motivated partly by a desire
to evaluate proposals to improve the quality of the work force through schooling, training,
medical services, and child care. But its main purpose as far as I am concerned is to
1 Can be also included Milton Friedman and Sherwin Rosen, and several others associated with the
University of Chicago
3remove a little of the mystery from the economic and social world that we live in.' (G.
Becker 1993 p. 25).
3. The Human Capital Research Programme
The second task we have to do to insert the Human Capital Theory into the Orthodox
or Neoclassical Economics Research Programme is to describe the Human Capital Theory
as a scientic research programme. `Research programmes consist of a `hard core' or
irrefutable theory surrounded by a `protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses that can be
further developed and refuted. A `positive heuristic' species how the research programme
should advance.' (Blaug 1976b).
As Backhouse indicates 2 , the main criticism of Lakatos's concept of a research
programme `is that characterizing them in terms of an invariant hard core is too narrow.
A broader concept of a research programme, allowing for a greater interaction between
programmes, and for hard cores which change over time, would appear to be required.'
In this line, the description of the Human Capital Research Programme will be rstly
described in this work as a part of the Neo-Walrasian Research Programme, as described
by Weintraub (1985) and Backhouse (1991). In addition, the Neo-Walrasian Research
Programme can be considered part of the Orthodox Economics Research Programme.
Yet, to present the Human Capital Theory as a research programme itself we need to
specify the proper hard core which conforms to the Human Capital Research Programme.
In the present discussion of placing the Human Capital Theory into the Neo-Walrasian
Research Programme, Weintraub's view of the Human Capital Theory as a part of the
protective belt of the Neo-Walrasian Research Programme is accepted regardless of the
content of the hard core of this bigger program. However, as noted before, to dene
the Human Capital Theory as a research programme itself, some of the human capital
2 `The Lakatosian legacy in economic methodology', in Backouse (ed.) Explorations in Economic
Methodology. From Lakatos to empirical philosophy of science. London and New York: Routledge. 1998
4hypotheses which form part of the protective belt of the bigger programme have to be
included into the hard core of the Human Capital Research Programme. Therefore, the
hard core of the Human Capital Programme contains the hypotheses inherited from the
bigger programmes and the specic fundamental assumptions about human capital.
The Human Capital Theory inherits the basic metaphysical assumptions from the
`hard core' of the Orthodox Economics Research Programme. These basic assumptions
are Individualism, Rationality, Private property rights and Market economy (Glass and
Johnson, 1988). The strongest development of either the `protective belt' or the positive
heuristics of the Orthodox Economics Programme began with the mathematical formula-
tion of Economics that has grown since the end of the First World War. The existence of
the Walrasian equilibrium was rened and mathematically demonstrated by Arrow and De-
breu in 1954, and this demonstration can be considered as the birth of the Neo-Walrasian
programme. Most of the modern economic theories can be considered within the `protective
belt' of the Neo-Walrasian Research Programme, just as Weintraub (1985) and Backhouse
(1993) point out. As noted above, whatever point of view we take on the description of
the positive and negative heuristics of the Neo-Walrasian programme, the Human Capital
Theory is considered a part of the programme's protective belt. The Human Capital Re-
search Programme then inherits the `hard core' from the Neo-Walrasian programme. The
basic assumption that must be added to the hard core of the Human Capital Research
Programme to convert the Human Capital Theory into a research program itself can be
enounced as follows:
HC1 Investments in human capital raise labor productivity and they are embodied
in the person investing. That is, human capital is non-separable from the person who
invests in it. Human capital investments respond to the same `rationality' of benets and
costs that postulate the remaining assumptions.
Taking the `hard core' Neo-Walrasian assumptions as postulated by Backhouse (1991),
the remaining assumptions which apply to the Human Capital Programme are:
5HC2 There exist economic agents.
HC3 Agents have preferences over outcomes.
HC4 Agents independently optimize subject to constraints.
HC5 Choices are made in interrelated markets.
HC6 Observable economic outcomes are co-ordinated, so they must be discussed
with reference to equilibrium states.
I do not include the Neo-Walrasian `hard core' assumption of complete information
into the `hard core' of the Human Capital Programme because imperfect information is a
powerful assumption which can explain many novel facts derived from the Human Capital
Programme.
The positive heuristic of the Neo-Walrasian Research Programme postulated by Back-
house (1991) is a set of research strategies that can be applied to most of neoclassical
economic models and to the Human Capital Theory in particular.
The `protective belt' of the Human Capital Programme is a long list of of human
capital `theories' (Blaug 1976a). One strategy to describe the `protective belt' of the
Human Capital Programme could be that of Blaug which described the main theoretical
progress of the programme. According to Blaug, this is the prediction of the demand of
noncompulsory education. In contrast to Blaug's strategy, the description of the protective
belt carried through this paper consists of a list of auxiliary hypotheses that are linked to
the neoclassical problem solving machinery and to the hard core to explain novel facts. A
discussion of whether these auxiliary hypotheses are ad hoc hypotheses will be provided
in the following Section along with the presentation of the novel facts that the research
programme explains.
The list of hypotheses considered to shape the protective belt consists of the following
six hypotheses.
PB1 General on-the job training increases labor productivity by the same amount
in dierent rms while specic on-the job training increases labor productivity more in the
6rm providing the training.
The second hypothesis can be expressed by two dierent forms which relate to each
other.
PB2 The way to compute earnings in the Human Capital Theory intermixes the
capital and income accounts in such a way that earnings are both net of investment costs
in human capital and gross of returns from investment in human capital.
PB2' The time pattern of depreciation of human capital is as follows: the economic
value of a trainee increases rapidly at the beginning so that human capital experiences an
appreciation during the investment period. Later there is a depreciation of human capital.
PB3 Household time can be devoted to produce human capital in addition to the
time devoted to labor and goods production.
PB4 Capital markets are imperfect.
PB5 Human capital is an asset with more risk and uncertainty and with less
liquidity than physical capital.
PB6 Ability and the amount invested in human capital are positively correlated.
The Human Capital Research Programme has been described by the ve clauses of
the hard core and the six hypotheses of the protective belt. Next, the Lakatosian appraisal
criterion of corroborated excess content, or novel facts, is followed. This appraisal criterion
has been criticized for lacking any rm epistemological basis (see Hands, 1991). In spite
of this criticism, authors like Blaug and Backhouse recommend the Lakatosian criterion to
appraise economics programmes. Among other reasons, the prediction of novel facts has a
history in economics that goes back well before Lakatos.
4. Evaluating the Human Capital Research Programme
In 1976, Blaug pointed out the diculty to evaluate the Human Capital Research Pro-
gramme because there were not rival theories of similar importance which can be com-
pared to the Human Capital Theory. However, Blaug predicted that the emerging theory
7of Signalling pioneered by Arrow (1973), Spence (1974) and Stiglitz (1975), which pro-
vides education with the only role of a signal of unobserved ability instead of the role of
increasing labor productivity, would become more important up to the point of replacing
the Human Capital Theory.
Thirty years have lapsed since Blaug's prospects of the Signalling Theory gradually
replacing the Human Capital Theory. Nevertheless, more theoretical models based on the
Human Capital assumptions have emerged over the years and numerous empirical work
has been done with the object of separating education eects on earnings from ability
eects on earnings (see Card, 1999). Therefore, the present appraisal of the Human Capital
Research Programme attempts to explain the growth and strength of the programme. This
section presents a discussion of the novel facts predicted by the Human Capital Theory as
well as a discussion of the programme's assumptions. This is done to counteract Blaug's
criticism that human capital models `resort to ad hoc auxiliary assumptions to account for
every perverse result, culminating in a certain tendency to mindlessly grind out the same
calculation with a new set of data, which are typical signs of degeneration in a scientic
research program.'(Blaug 1976a, p. 849).
I now go on to present a discussion on several important novel facts explained by the
Human Capital Theory.
4.1. Age-earnings proles
In 1935, Walsh published tables of median earnings by age and education which showed
that the discounted value of life earnings increased with the level of education. Walsh
focused on returns of investment in education measured by life earnings but he did not
focus on the steeper earnings prole by age. The observation of an increasing and concave
age-earnings prole, more inclined for more educated persons, as seen for example in Min-
cer (1958), had been explained before by psychological theories of `learning curves'. A new
economic interpretation appears in the work of Gary Becker who explains the use of auxil-
8iary assumptions expressed above (PB2 or PB2') which acknowledge the special meaning
of observed earnings in relation to investments in human capital. Since human capital is
embodied in the person investing it, observed earnings are both net of the investment and
gross of returns in human capital. This is the reason why depreciation of human capital
has a dierent time pattern to that of physical capital and it helps explain why higher
investments imply steeper earnings proles.
Therefore, assumption PB2 cannot be considered an ad hoc assumption at all, but as
a direct implication of intrinsic characteristics of the human capital that it is fundamental
for the hard core of the research programme.
The form of the earnings prole helps explain the low correlation between consumption
and earnings for young people. Moreover, it can explain a negative correlation between
the consumption and earnings of young people, a fact that is disallowed by the Friedman's
theory of the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
This assumption also helps explain an anomaly in the earnings prole that can be
caused by some investments in human capital. This happens when the investment in
human capital is nanced by an increase in the worker's wage, the so-called productive
wage increase, which is given by the rm to pay worker investments in human capital
provided outside the rm.
Murphy and Welch (1990) mention the large collection of empirical literature devoted
to the study of age-earnings proles. They show that the standard formulation of age-
earnings proles understates early career earnings growth by about 30-50 percent and
overstates midcareer growth by 20-50 percent. However, simple alternative specications
that t the data are available. Also, Thornton and Rodgers (1997) survey and interpret
the empirical literature that estimates age-earnings proles from corss-sectional data.
4.2. Unemployment and turnover
Unemployment has been generally explained by macroeconomic theories such as the Phillips
9curve. Becker brings the issue of turnover in employment by arguing that `to bring turnover
into the analysis of specic training is not, therefore, to introduce a deus ex machina but
it is made necessary by the important link between them.' (Becker 1993, p.43). That is,
Becker argues that PB1 is not an ad hoc assumption which allows him to explain turnover.
The dierentiation of on-the-job training between general and specic training is done
to discuss who pays for training, the worker or the rm?. The answer depends on the type
of productivity increase that the training provides. In this way, when it is the rm which
pays for training, i.e., hiring costs, the rm has an incentive to retain the worker either by
paying him or her a higher wage than in competing rms or oering long term contracts.
Therefore, workers who receive more specic training experience lower turnover and lower
unemployment during periods of crisis than workers with training of a general type.
Topel (1993) shows evidence of higher unemployment and turnover among the non-
skilled and low-wage workers although he does not specify the nature of the investment in
human capital.
4.3. Wage dierentials and mobility among rms
Similarly to the discussion on turnover, the explanation of both wage dierentials and lack
of mobility of workers among rms is provided by assumption PB1. Because of workers
or rms pay for on-the-job training by either a cut or an increase in wages respectively,
the Human Capital Theory can explain a dierential between wages and productivity in
a competitive environment. Furthermore and without having to assume mobility costs,
human capital can explain wage dierentials and the lack of mobility among rms given
the costs of specic training.
Barron, Black and Lowenstein (1989) examine the relationship among on-the-job train-
ing, starting wages, wage growth, and productivity growth.
104.4. Demand for Schooling
The most important part of human capital is that acquired in the education system. Hence,
one of the main results of the the Human Capital Theory should be to predict enrollment
at dierent levels of education.
The demand for schooling is usually understood as the level of enrollment which
is the result of an individual optimization problem which nds the equilibrium between
desires and schooling opportunities. On the one hand, it models the proper demand
of individual investment in education. As with every demand function, the quantity of
education depends on the price of the investment in education that is expressed as the
marginal rate of return. The marginal rate of return which traces the demand function
decreases owing to the embodiment of human capital. Dierent people have dierent
demand curves, therefore a person who has a higher marginal rate of return for the same
level of education may have a higher demand curve. With this in mind, the Human
Capital Theory assumes that a higher demand curve re
ects higher capabilities (PB6).
On the other hand, it models the supply of education that shows the increasing marginal
costs of nancing education. That is, people with more facilities of funding education
have lower supplies curves. There are dierences in the accessibility of funds because of
imperfect capital markets and the non-liquidity of human capital that cannot be used
as collateral in loans (PB4 and PB5). The equilibrium result, known as the observable
demand for schooling (level of enrollment), implies that people with more capabilities and
more facilities of nancing it demand more education.
The demand curve moves upward either because of an improvement in the expectation
of returns or higher ability. Thus, the present returns and employment opportunities of
graduates aect the expectations of returns of investors and then the level of enrollment.
On the supply side, every factor that lowers the supply curves increases enrollment. That
is, factors like the kind of improvements in the capital market, richer parents, subsidies
and scholarships, all of them increase the level of enrollment.
11Since life is nite, the present value of returns diminishes with age at the same time
that the cost of the investment increases with age. The consequence is that the demand
of human capital decreases with age. This is coherent with the observation of higher
enrollment rates in non-compulsory education for youngsters.
The assumption that ability and the amount of investment in human capital are
positively correlated is already considered by Becker and Chiswick (1966) and it supposes
an advance to the Signalling or Credentialism Theory. The complementarity understood
in this way and not as the rivalry between these theories has been tested for example by
Card (1999) who nds and upwards ability bias around a 10 percent in the returns of
education. Empirical facts on the returns to education which have been rationalized by
some authors (see for example, Weiss, 1995) as anomalies of the human capital theory
can be rationalized by the correlation between ability and education (PB6) which predicts
heterogeneity in the returns to education across the population.
Recent policy evaluation models describe the relationship between returns to education
and the enrollment level measured as the probability of going to school. The paper by Willis
and Rosen (1979) pioneers these kind of models.
4.5. Financing of Education
Indeed, the Human Capital Theory has not clear predictions about who and by which
means investments in human capital are nanced. Its only clear prediction as to who
nances human capital refers to on-the-job training. The answer to this problem depends
on Assumption PB1 which predicts that workers nance their general training by means
of lower wages during the investment period and rms nance specic training by oering
higher wages to theirs employees than competing rms.
In relation to nancing of education, all the weight of the nancing models lies in
assumptions PB4 and PB5. That is, capital markets are more imperfect to nance human
capital than physical capital. Then, the private nancing of education is accounted for by
12one's own funds or family resources.
The rationality of the public nancing of investments in human capital responds to
the objective of either equalizing opportunities or the supply curve of human capital for
each person. The eect it has is to diminish the dispersion of the distribution of amounts
invested in human capital. An alternative rationality to explain the public nancing of
investments in human capital was informally anticipated by Becker who, in the Ryerson
lecture given at the University of Chicago in 1989, stated that `by combining publicly sub-
sidized schooling with a social security system, countries may have found a very crude and
indirect, but perhaps reasonably eective, way to provide loans to children that get repaid
when the parents are old and collect retirement benets (see also Becker and Murphy,
1988)'. The same idea has been formally modeled by Boldrin and Montes (2005).
Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) analyze the eects of dierent nance systems on
educational resources and equity.
4.6. Personal distribution of earnings
According to Becker, `The body of economic analysis rather desperately needs a reliable
theory of the distribution of incomes. Whether or not this approach [ human capital
approach] is ultimately judged to be satisfactory, it should demonstrate that such a theory
need not be a patchwork of Pareto distributions, ability vectors, and ad hoc probability
mechanisms, but can rely on the basic economic principles that have so often proven their
worth elsewhere.' (Becker 1993, p. 149).
Inequality in the distribution of earnings can be substantially explained by inequality
in investments in human capital. At the same time, the Human Capital Theory can also
explain why inequality in earnings is greater than the inequality in the amount invested
in human capital. The main reason for the greater inequality in earnings is the positive
inclination of the supply curve of human capital which is due to the increasing diculty
of nancing larger amounts of human capital. That is, Assumptions PB4 and PB5 help
13explain the inequality in earnings.
The dispersion in earnings of people with the same level of education is explained
because a dierent marginal rate of return and a dierent marginal cost is associated to
the same amount invested in equilibrium. The dierence, therefore, lies in dierences in
abilities and opportunities to nance the investment.
The Human Capital Theory can also explain why the distribution of earnings is skewed
to the right. One reason is that the product of two symmetrical distributions is a positively
skewed distribution, indeed, the more skewed the distribution the more positively corre-
lated distributions are. Therefore, although the distributions of ability and investment in
human capital were symmetrical, the distribution of earnings would be positively skewed.
Furthermore, although each person had the same ability, the distribution of supply curves
which re
ects the distribution of nancial conditions is skewed. This eect could lead to
inequality and would skew the earnings distribution.
Neal and Rosen (1999) explore several models that address the stylized facts of the
personal earnings distributions, among them human capital models which illustrate how
endowments of wealth and talent in
uence the investment decisions that generate observed
distributions of earnings.
No discussion is presented on implications of the human capital theory on fertility and
female labor participation.
5. Conclusions
The main author of the Human Capital Theory, Gary Becker, argues that to bring some is-
sues as turnover, earnings distributions, or the intermixing or income and capital account
in observed earnings, is not `a deux ex machina, is not `capricious', or is not `a patch-
work'. This paper attemps to justify Becker's arguments by arranging the theory minimal
assumptions into the form of a research programme. The objective of this paper is to
help show why the `novel facts' explained by the theory are a direct consequence of these
14minimal assumptions. The paper also attempts explain why these minimal assumptions
are fundamental and natural assumptions linked to the characteristics of human capital.
That is, the auxiliary assumptions that shape the protective belt of the program are not
presented a posteriori to ll the program with new empirical content.
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